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The Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute: 
Reining in The Government’s Previously 
Unbridled Ability to Seize Pretrial Assets 
 
By Kristyn Fleming Francese 
 
Abstract 
 
American organized crime movies are synonymous with a 
climatic raid and seizure of illegal assets – typically drugs and 
guns.  But what is really encompassed within the Government’s 
grasp; what are the “illegal assets”?  The truth is that the 
Government has a wide reach and the criminal seizures don’t end 
when the screen goes black and the credits roll.  The Federal 
Criminal Forfeiture Statute, as applied to RICO and CCE cases, 
typically entails the forfeiture of any asset connected to the 
underlying crimes.  Given that criminal forfeiture penalties have 
ethical and constitutional considerations, it is not surprising to 
learn that a recent United States Supreme Court decision has 
scaled back the Government’s power over its ability to seize.  This 
Note will provide an overview of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture 
Statute, as well as RICO and CCE in order to provide context, 
will detail the case law history of the statute in application, will 
examine the ethical and constitutional considerations, and will 
question the future of the controversially applied law. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Movies like American Gangster provide the general public’s 
foundation for what occurs when a crime organization gets taken 
down by the Federal Government.  As such, Government raids 
and seizure of the illegal contents within criminal facilities are 
as commonplace as the injection of a mole within a crime ring.  
But the reality of the Government seizures, and the forfeitures 
that ensue, are not as widely understood.  In the scene that 
depicted the raid on notorious gangster Frank Lucas’ home in 
Teaneck, New Jersey, moviegoers watched as the Drug 
Enforcement Agency uncovered and seized large amounts of 
1
(634-659) FRANCESE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/18  9:22 PM 
2018 FEDERAL CRIMINAL FORFEITURE STATUTE  635 
hidden cash stashed in the home.1  But what happened to the 
large estate that Lucas left behind?  The Government seized 
$584,683 in cash just from the raid alone.2  Eventually, Lucas 
was forced to forfeit it all – “[t]he properties in Chicago, Detroit, 
Miami, North Carolina, Puerto Rico – they took everything,” 
including the money held in his offshore Cayman Island 
accounts.3  Lucas himself estimated his offshore wealth alone to 
have been around $52 million at the time he was arrested.4  
Given the authority’s unethical conduct that permeated the 
takedown of the Lucas empire, there is one major question that 
the general public is left with: who or what authorized the 
Government to legally5 take Lucas’ illegally-gained assets? 
In 1970, Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 8536 to provide the 
Government with a statutory vehicle to seize and secure a 
criminal defendant’s assets pending trial.  The Federal Criminal 
Forfeiture Statute applies to a laundry list of crimes that fall 
generally under, or include, the Federal Racketeer Influenced 
Corrupt Organizations and Continuing Criminal Enterprise 
statutes.  The policy argument supporting the criminal 
forfeiture statute is a sound one: absent a pretrial asset seizure, 
a person facing criminal charges that often entail monetary 
penalties would have the ability to move assets during trial so 
that post-conviction, the assets are no longer in the defendant’s 
possession to be seized.  This, however, must be balanced against 
the serious constitutional and ethical implications, namely the 
 
1.  AMERICAN GANGSTER (Universal Pictures 2007). 
2.  Jill Gerston, 19 Indicted in Heroin Traffic in City, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 
1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/30/archives/19-indicted-in-heroin-
traffic-in-city.html. 
3.  RON CHEPESIUK, SUPERFLY: THE TRUE, UNTOLD STORY OF FRANK LUCAS, 
AMERICAN GANGSTER (Street Certified Entertainment 2007).  
4.  Mark Jacobson, The Return of Superfly, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 14, 2000), 
http://nymag.com/nymag/features/3649/.  
5.  The movie portrays many cops within the local police department as 
crooked, frequently extorting Lucas for some of his ill-gotten gains.  Out of the 
total 70 Special Investigations Unit officers working for the NYPD at the time 
of Lucas’ demise, 52 were eventually either jailed or indicted.  Jake Coyle, 
Original ‘Gangster’ Outshines Film, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 7, 2007, 7:41 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/07/AR200711 
0701954_pf.html. 
6.  This statute, as the foundation of this Note, will hereinafter be 
interchangeably referred to as either 21 U.S.C. § 853 or the Federal Criminal 
Forfeiture Statute. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/10
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Sixth Amendment. 
Since 1970, courts have broadly interpreted the statute so 
as to extend significant power to the Government.  In 1989, the 
United States Supreme Court was faced with the decision of 
whether the statute included assets that would be used to pay 
for the defendant’s attorney’s fees.7  The United States Supreme 
Court in Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, held that although 
the statute had no explicit exception pertaining to attorney’s 
fees, the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were 
not violated.8  That same day, the United States Supreme Court 
issued a near identical holding in United States v. Monsanto, 
reinforcing the principle that the Government’s interest in 
seizing a defendant’s assets does not violate a defendant’s right 
to obtain and choose their own counsel.9 
With the constitutionality of the statute initially resolved, a 
circuit split developed regarding the ability for a defendant to 
object to a pretrial seizure determination.  The Federal Criminal 
Forfeiture Statute requires probable cause that the defendant 
be guilty of the crime in order to warrant a pretrial asset 
seizure.10  Among many factors, one substantially determinative 
factor is a grand jury’s indictment.  By 2014, the circuit courts 
were split over whether a defendant, who was indicted by a 
grand jury, may object to, and essentially relitigate, the issue of 
their probability of guilt in regard to it being the basis for asset 
forfeiture.  The split was reconciled in Kaley v. United States, 
where the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant 
is not entitled to question a grand jury’s determination, and 
therefore, may not object to an asset seizure-probable cause 
determination.11 
With the constitutional arguments against the statute 
quashed, it is important to consider other non-constitutional 
issues that the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute may pose.  
The Government’s broad power to seize a defendant’s assets has 
many ethical implications, such as the issue of criminal 
contingency fees, the ability for the Government to essentially 
 
7.  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).  
8.  Id. 
9.  See generally 491 U.S. 600 (1989). 
10.  21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2) (2012). 
11.  See generally 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014). 
3
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control a defendant’s choice of counsel, and potential pressure 
during plea negotiations. 
This year, however, the United States Supreme Court 
curtailed the Government’s previously expansive forfeiture 
power in its 2016 Luis v. United States decision.  The Luis case 
stands for the proposition that only assets that can be 
sufficiently tied to the criminal activity of the defendant may be 
subjected to pretrial seizure.12  This decision signals a significant 
halt to the previously expanding power of the Government in 
criminal asset forfeiture cases. 
This Note analyzes the history of the Federal Criminal 
Forfeiture Statute and its future, given the recent United States 
Supreme Court decision, in five parts.  Part II will describe the 
relevant provisions of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute 
and its legislative history to provide a foundation for the 
analysis.  Part III will delve into the notable case law referenced 
above.  Part IV will discuss the ethical issues surrounding the 
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute and the Government’s 
previously unbridled power.  Part V will discuss the Luis case 
and its effects.  Finally, Part VI questions the future of the 
Government’s power regarding the Federal Criminal Forfeiture 
Statute given the United States Supreme Court’s denial of the 
petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Nacchio v. United States – a 
case that was calling for a clarification of the underlying purpose 
of 21 U.S.C. § 853.13 
 
II. History and Overview of the Criminal Forfeiture Statute 
 
This Part will give a brief overview of the history of criminal 
forfeitures and define the two pertinent criminal statutes that 
will appear throughout this Note. 
The United States Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute that 
exists today can be traced back to Old English Rule.14  Under the 
King’s rule, inanimate objects causing an accidental death were 
forfeited to the crown,15 as were a person’s chattels for conviction 
 
12.  See generally Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
13.  See generally 824 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 
S. Ct. 2239 (2017). 
14.  Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). 
15.  Id. at 680-81. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/10
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of felonies and treason,16 and for violations of customs and 
revenue laws.17  The English concept of criminal forfeiture18 
survived the American Revolution, but existed throughout the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and most of the twentieth centuries 
invisibly. 
In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Criminal Forfeiture 
Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853, to further punish those involved in 
drug and organized crime by subjecting their property to 
forfeiture.19  This statute opened the door to the Government’s 
ability to ensure that any and all proceeds tied to the illicit 
activity would not be realized upon either preliminary, or final 
judgment.  “Until 1970, American law did not often use the 
concept of ‘criminal forfeiture.’ . . . Today, federal prosecutors 
make criminal forfeiture a routine part of criminal law 
enforcement in federal cases.”20  In fact, some courts have noted 
that prior to the 1970 enactment of 21 U.S.C. § 853, criminal 
forfeiture was prohibited.21 
It is worth noting that forfeiture authorized under the 
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute is an “in personam action 
against a defendant in a criminal case, and forfeiture in such a 
case is imposed as a sanction against the defendant upon his 
conviction.”22  This means that, as will be discussed in Parts III 
and IV, a defendant’s exposure to forfeiture in terms of what can 
be seized is much greater than in a civil, in rem forfeiture action.  
Nonetheless, 21 U.S.C. § 853 provided a vehicle with which the 
Government could seize unlawfully gained assets, so long as the 
defendant had, or had likely, committed the predicate crime. 
 
 
16.  Id. at 682. 
17.  Id. at 681. 
18. Criminal forfeiture, dating back to 1866, is defined as “[a] 
governmental proceeding brought against a person to seize property as 
punishment for the person’s criminal behavior. Criminal Forfeiture, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
19.  21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012). 
20.  Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture: A Royal Pain in 
the Assets, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 45 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
21.  United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 387 (W.D. Mich. 
1987). 
22.  United States v. Certain Real Prop. Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, W. 
Bloomfield, Mich., 910 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1990). 
5
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The list of crimes that satisfies the predicate offense 
requirement under the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute is 
not a short one.  There are two criminal statutes that will be 
discussed in this Part, in conjunction, in order to provide a 
statutory foundation for the subsequent case law analysis. 
 
A. Organized Crime Control Act – RICO 
 
The first is the Organized Crime Control Act, passed on 
October 15, 1970,23 and Title IX, commonly referred to as the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”), in 
particular.  The purpose of RICO’s passage was for the 
“elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and 
racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in 
interstate commerce.”24  Violators of RICO are subjected to a 
forfeiture penalty of “any property constituting, or derived from, 
any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, 
from racketeering activity . . . .”25  Specifically, RICO calls for 
the forfeiture of 
 
(1) any interest the person has acquired or 
maintained in violation of section 1962 
(2) any– 
(A) interest in; 
(B) security of; 
(C) claim against; or 
(D) property or contractual right of any  
kind affording a source of influence over; 
any enterprise which the person has established, 
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in 
the conduct of, in violation of section 1962. has 
acquired or maintained in violation of section 
1962[.]26 
 
 
23.   18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2012). 
24.   OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-110.100 (citing 
S.REP. NO. 617, 91st Cong., 76 (1969)). 
25.  18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (2012). 
26.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(1)-(2) (2012). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/10
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Further, the word “property” itself is defined as including “(1) 
real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found 
in land; and (2) tangible and intangible personal property, 
including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities.”27  
If not redundant, the statute is nearly all-encompassing. 
RICO is often looked at by the public as one of the United 
States’ “most powerful and sweeping laws[,]” because of the law’s 
ability to “stitch together crimes” and make the Government’s 
job of convicting those that are undetectably involved, easier.28  
The United States Department of Justice itself even 
characterizes RICO as providing for “powerful criminal 
penalties” that “broadly appl[y] to all criminal conduct within its 
ambit regardless of whether it involves organized crime.”29 
 
B. Continuing Criminal Enterprise – A Weighty Prong of 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act 
 
The second statute is the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970,30 pursuant to which 
Congress criminalized engagement in a Continuing Criminal 
Enterprise (“CCE”).  CCE is often described as the “RICO drug 
statute[,]”31 and “is commonly referred to as the ‘kingpin’ 
statute.”32  CCE makes it a crime for anyone to commit a 
predicate crime that violates a federal narcotics law, as part of a 
continuing series of three or more drug offenses, in concert with 
five or more persons, where the defendant acts as the organizer, 
 
27.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(b)(1)-(2) (2012). 
28.  Nathan Koppel, They Call It RICO, and It Is Sweeping, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 20, 2011, 5:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870 
4881304576094110829882704?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_sections_news. 
29.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 A 
MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 1, 6 (6th revised ed. 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/file/870856/download (emphasis added). 
30.  Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). 
31.  Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The 
Transformation of American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 239, 
253 (1993) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) as the Continuing Criminal 
Enterprise statute). 
32.  Barbara Sicalides, Comment, RICO, CCE, and International 
Extradition, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1288 (1989). 
7
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supervisor, or manager with respect to the persons involved, and 
the defendant gains substantial income as a result.33  Violators 
of CCE are subjected to imprisonment, significant fines, and 
forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853.  In addition to the 
forfeiture authorized under 21 U.S.C. § 853, CCE sets out a list 
of seizable assets that is even more expansive.  21 U.S.C. § 881 
provides: 
 
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the 
United States and no property right shall exist in 
them: 
 
(1)  All controlled substances which have 
been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or 
acquired in violation of this subchapter. 
(2)  All raw materials, products and 
equipment of any kind which are used, or 
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, 
processing, delivering, importing, or exporting 
any controlled substance or listed chemical in 
violation of this subchapter. 
(3)  All property which is used, or intended for 
use, as a container for property. . . . 
(4)  All conveyances, including aircraft, 
vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to 
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession, or concealment of [illegal] property. 
(5)  All books, records, and research, 
including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data 
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of 
this subchapter. 
(6)  All moneys, negotiable instruments, 
securities, or other things of value furnished or 
intended to be furnished by any person in 
exchange for a controlled substance or listed 
chemical in violation of this subchapter, all 
proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all 
 
33.  21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (2012). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/10
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moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities 
used or intended to be used to facilitate any 
violation of this subchapter. 
(7)  All real property, including any right, 
title, and interest (including any leasehold 
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land 
and any appurtenances or improvements, which 
is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or 
part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, 
a violation of this subchapter. 
(8)  All controlled substances which have 
been possessed in violation of this subchapter. 
(9)  All listed chemicals, all drug 
manufacturing equipment, all tableting 
machines, all encapsulating machines, and all 
gelatin capsules, which have been imported, 
exported, manufactured, possessed, distributed, 
dispensed, acquired, or intended to be distributed, 
dispensed, acquired, imported, or exported, in 
violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of 
this chapter. 
(10)  Any drug paraphernalia . . . . 
(11)  Any firearm . . . used or intended to be 
used to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession, or concealment of property described 
in paragraph (1) or (2) and any proceeds traceable 
to such property.34 
 
Both CCE and RICO are notable because they codified what 
is referred to as compound liability.35  Other than the notable 
difference that CCE requires that the predicate crime involve 
illegal drug activity, the two criminal statues are very similar 
for the purposes of this Note. 
 
 
 
34.  21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012).  Although lengthy, a full transcript of the 
statute’s forfeiture power is necessary to depict just how truly all-
encompassing the statutes are and how the Government’s broad power to seize 
appears to be backed by legislative support. 
35.  Brenner, supra note 31, at 241, 243 n.18. 
9
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C. Forfeiture Under RICO and CCE 
 
Under both criminal statutes, through the 21 U.S.C. § 853 
vehicle, in order for property to be forfeited, it must be 
considered “‘tainted’” – sufficiently tied to the illegal activity, 
often considered “‘proceeds’” of the crime or used to “‘facilitate’ a 
criminal activity.”36  Many courts use the “‘but for’ test . . . 
[where] property is considered proceeds and therefore deemed 
forfeitable if a ‘person would not have [the property] but for the 
criminal offense.’”37 
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
32.2, the indictment must contain the charge of forfeiture upon 
judgment.38  Thus, in order for assets to be seized, a jury must 
find probable cause that the defendant committed the 
underlying crime.  Rule 32.2, however, does not require that the 
indictment identify the property which will be subject to 
forfeiture.39  Upon a final judgment, or preliminary injunction, 
the Government must show the requisite nexus between the 
sought property and the predicate crime.40 
Although enacted in 1970, initially, RICO and CCE 
provisions were not as readily enforced as the two 1970 statutes 
envisioned.41  In fact, allegations of RICO and CCE violations 
were not commonplace in the courts until the 1980’s when the 
“FBI and Department of Justice mounted a major offensive 
against organized crime.”42  The legislature’s endorsement and 
subsequent “expansion of criminal forfeiture . . . made it possible 
for the government to seek forfeiture more aggressively and with 
a greater likelihood of success[.]”43  Therefore, application of 
 
36.  Garretson, supra note 20, at 49. 
37.  United States v. Johnson, No. DKC 13-0294, 2014 WL 2215854, at *5 
(D. Md. May 28, 2014) (citing United States v. Nicolo, 597 F. Supp. 2d 342, 346 
(W.D.N.Y. 2009)) (citations omitted). 
38.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a). 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Referring to the Organized Crime Control Act and Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.  See David J. Fried, Rationalizing 
Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 339 (1988). 
42.  David Witwer, Mobsters, Unions, and Feds: The Mafia and the 
American Labor Movement by James B. Jacobs, 60 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 302, 
303 (2007) (book review). 
43.  Fried, supra note 41, at 330. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/10
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RICO and CCE gained traction and speed, and by 1986, the 
Government had RICO and/or CCE cases pending against 
seventeen of the nation’s twenty-four notorious crime families.44 
In order to fully comprehend the severity of the forfeiture 
statutes identified above, it is necessary to consider what is 
subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853.  As mentioned, 
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute actions apply in personam, 
meaning that the judgments do not attach to the specific 
property, but to the person and, therefore, any subjectable 
property.45  Subjectable property includes “property 
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds” obtained as a result 
of the violation or any “property used, or intended to be used, . . . 
to commit, or to facilitate . . . the violation.”46  “Property,” for the 
purposes of this statute, is defined as real property,47 as well as 
“tangible and intangible personal property, including . . . 
interests, claims, and securities.”48  Additionally, access to such 
an expansive list of potentially seized property is available, 
absent a court finding the charged individual guilty of the crimes 
with which the criminal forfeiture statutes were predicated on.  
21 U.S.C. § 853(e) allows the Government to seek a preliminary 
injunction or restraining order to gain control of the assets prior 
to trial.49  Although the purpose is to ensure that a defendant 
does not dispose of the assets in order to avoid forfeiture and to 
“preserve the availability of [the] property,”50 it also indicates 
the vast authority the Government has against a purported 
RICO or CCE violator, which has been expanding up until the 
most recent United States Supreme Court decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44.  Koppel, supra note 28. 
45.  United States v. Certain Real Prop. Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, W. 
Bloomfield, Mich., 910 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1990). 
46.  21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1)-(2) (2012). 
47.  21 U.S.C. § 853(b)(1) (2012). 
48.  21 U.S.C. § 853 (b)(2) (2012). 
49.  21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (2012). 
50.  Id. 
11
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III. Case Law Review 
 
As previously mentioned, and will be discussed in Part IV, 
the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute poses numerous issues 
that have the potential to infringe on a criminal defendant’s 
rights.  Case law decided over the last four decades, since its 
enactment, addressed some of these concerns, while others still 
remain unsettled.  Despite the well-founded concerns 
surrounding the ethicality of the application of 21 U.S.C. § 853, 
courts have continuously not only looked past these concerns, 
but have interpreted the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute 
broadly, which has given the Government extensive power in 
application and reach. 
This Part will provide a chronological analysis of United 
States Supreme Court decisions that interpret the Federal 
Criminal Forfeiture Statute in application through the RICO 
and CCE vehicles.  Since the rendering of the foundational 1989 
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, and United States v. 
Monsanto cases, the United States Supreme Court has 
categorically interpreted the Federal Criminal Forfeiture 
Statute in a broad sense, so as to provide much power to the 
Government with little restrictions. 
 
A.  Criminal Forfeiture Statute and the Right to Counsel: 
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States 
 
In Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, a man named 
Reckmeyer “was charged in a multicount indictment with 
running a massive drug importation and distribution scheme.  
The scheme was alleged to be a continuing criminal enterprise 
(CCE) in violation of . . . 21 U.S.C. § 848 . . . .”51  The District 
Court granted a restraining order forbidding Reckmeyer from 
transferring any of his “listed assets that were potentially 
forfeitable.”52  To represent him in his pending criminal trial, 
Reckmeyer retained Caplin & Drysdale (“C&D”) and paid the 
firm $25,000, in violation of the restraining order.53  Reckmeyer 
 
51.  491 U.S. 617, 619 (1989). 
52.  Id. at 620. 
53.  Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/10
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later moved to modify the restraining order so as to allow him to 
continue paying the firm – he needed to use some of the 
restrained assets in order to, essentially, afford C&D.54  Shortly 
after moving to modify the restraining order, Reckmeyer entered 
into a plea deal with the Government.55 
In lieu of the plea agreement the District Court considered 
the motion to modify moot, considering that, pursuant to the 
plea deal, Reckmeyer agreed to forfeit all of the specified 
assets.56  Following the forfeiture of Reckmeyer’s assets, C&D 
asserted that it had a claim to $170,000 worth of the seized 
assets, along with an additional $25,000 for the pre-indictment 
legal services.57  The District Court granted C&D’s claim.58  On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, saying that a failure to do 
so violated Reckmeyer’s Sixth Amendment rights.59  The Court 
of Appeals, agreeing to hear the case en banc, reversed.60  
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court heard the case 
and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ en banc reversal, holding that 
the assets were improperly released to C&D.61  The United 
States Supreme Court held that there is no specific exception in 
the statute for attorney’s fees and that this non-exception does 
not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because the 
Sixth Amendment only guarantees the right to adequate 
representation, and not choice of counsel using money that is not 
“theirs.”62  This case set the precedent that the Federal Criminal 
Forfeiture Statute, which does not provide an exception for 
funds necessary to pay for an attorney, does not violate a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right when a defendant is found 
guilty of the crime(s) that the forfeiture was predicated on. 
 
54.  Id. at 621. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 621 
(1989). 
58.  See United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp 1191, 1198 (E.D. Va. 
1986). 
59.  United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987). 
60.  See In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 
F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988). 
61.  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 622 
(1989). 
62.  Id. at 625. 
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B. The Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute and Pretrial 
Seizures: United States v. Monsanto 
 
On the same day that the United States Supreme Court 
issued the Caplin & Drysdale decision, the Court revisited the 
increasingly problematic Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute in 
terms of pretrial seizures.63  In United States v. Monsanto, 
defendant Monsanto was indicted with running a large-scale 
heroin distribution enterprise – specifically, in violation of RICO 
and CCE.64  Following the indictment, a restraining order was 
granted freezing the defendant’s assets.65  Monsanto then moved 
to vacate the restraining order so he could use a portion of the 
assets to pay for an attorney.66  The District Court initially 
denied the motion to vacate.67  The Second Circuit remanded the 
case for a hearing regarding Monsanto’s Sixth Amendment 
argument.68  The District Court, again, denied the motion to 
vacate, holding that the Government had “‘overwhelmingly 
established a likelihood’” that Monsanto would ultimately be 
found guilty at trial, and that the assets would be permanently 
forfeited.69  The Second Circuit, this time hearing the case en 
banc, modified the restraining order so as to permit Monsanto to 
use the assets to pay his attorney.70 
In line with the Caplin & Drysdale decision, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed, reiterating the pronouncement 
that a criminal statute providing for 21 U.S.C. § 853 forfeiture, 
such as RICO and CCE, which contains no provisional exception 
for attorney’s fees, does not interfere with a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.71  As stated in the Caplin & Drysdale 
 
63.  Avalyn Y. Castillo, Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys Fees: The Rights 
Remaining to the Accused and His Attorney After Caplin & Drysdale and U.S. 
v. Monsanto, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 126 (1990). 
64.  491 U.S. 600, 602 (1989). 
65.  Id. at 603-04. 
66.  Id. at 604. 
67.  Id. 
68.  United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam); see also Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 604. 
69.  United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 605 (1989). 
70.  See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991); see also 
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 604-06 (1989). 
71.  See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 600 (1989). 
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decision, 
 
The forfeiture statute does not impermissibly 
burden a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
retain counsel of his choice.  A defendant has no 
Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s 
money for services rendered by an attorney even 
if those funds are the only way that that 
defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his 
choice.  Such money, though in his possession, is 
not rightfully his.72 
 
C. Reconciling a Split Within the Circuits: Kaley v. United 
States and Asset Forfeiture Hearings 
 
Following the Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto cases, the 
circuits began to diverge in terms of rigidity of application and 
interpretation of the concept that the Federal Criminal 
Forfeiture Statue does not violate a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.  Some of the circuits decided to impute 
constitutional reasoning in deciding whether to grant a 
defendant a hearing on the issue of probable cause in an 
indictment when it led to asset forfeiture.  For example, in the 
Second Circuit, a defendant may, at the court’s discretion, be 
entitled to a hearing reviewing the issue of probable cause, 
following a grand jury indictment.73  In the Second Circuit, and 
in the circuits that sit on this side of the split, a defendant must 
show a genuine need to access the assets in order to retain 
counsel.74 
Other circuits, however, have followed the Caplin & 
Drysdale and Monsanto cases strictly, holding that grand jury 
indictments are final and not reviewable via hearings to re-
determine the issue of probable cause when it led to an asset 
forfeiture.  A recent Eleventh Circuit case illustrates this side of 
the split.  In United States v. Kaley, the defendants were indicted 
 
72.  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 618 
(1989). 
73.  See, e.g., United States v. Bonventre, 720 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2013). 
74.  Id. at 126. 
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for crimes relating to a scheme to steal prescription medical 
devices and resell them for profit.75  Immediately after the 
indictment, the court granted an interim restraining order 
freezing the defendants’ assets based on a finding of probable 
cause.76  At a hearing following the indictment, the defendants 
attempted to contest the grand jury’s determination that there 
was probable cause that they were guilty and that their assets 
would ultimately be forfeited as a result.77  The Eleventh Circuit 
held that criminal defendants cannot challenge an evidentiary 
basis (such as a finding of probable cause) that supports an 
indictment and leads to an asset forfeiture.78  This bright line 
rule contradicted Second Circuit precedent, and in order to 
resolve the circuit split, the United States Supreme Court took 
the Kaley case on appeal. 
In Kaley v. United States, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed, ruling in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit and 
against Second Circuit.79  The United States Supreme Court 
proffered that the function of the grand jury is to make such 
evidentiary determinations, and that a defendant is not entitled 
to review or re-litigate the issues once they are determined.80 
I generally agree with the proffered justification for a 
refusal to review evidentiary findings based on the grand jury’s 
function.  I disagree, however, with the outcome that these grand 
jury evidentiary determinations are not reviewable given the 
substantial ethical implications they carry and the general 
controversial considerations that still surround the Federal 
Criminal Forfeiture Statute. 
 
IV. The Ethical Issues of Pretrial Asset Seizures 
 
In 1989, the Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto cases 
essentially disposed of any Constitutional arguments against 
criminal forfeiture statutes.  Since then, especially following the 
United States Supreme Court’s following of the Eleventh Circuit 
 
75.  677 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012). 
76.  See id. at 1317. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. at 1330. 
79.  Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1090 (2014). 
80.  Id. at 1097. 
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in Kaley v. United States, courts have strictly interpreted the 
statutes and applied the precedent, giving the Government 
significant power over criminal defendants.  But what are the 
ethical issues that this line of interpretation poses?  This Part 
will identify the issues, both constitutional and purely ethical, 
that the application of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute 
poses in order to provide a framework of thinking when 
analyzing the evolution and future of relevant case law. 
Although the Sixth Amendment issues surrounding the 
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute are well settled, it is worth 
fleshing out the ethical considerations behind the argument.  
The Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute poses a theoretical 
restriction on a defendant’s choice of counsel.  The Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that a 
defendant in a criminal trial may “have the [a]ssistance of 
[c]ounsel for his defence [sic].”81  Although the Sixth Amendment 
has been interpreted not to apply to scenarios where assets are 
no longer deemed to be a defendant’s,82 the ethical implication is 
still worth consideration because with pretrial seizures, there is 
the possibility that funds which are rightfully a defendant’s may 
be wrongfully frozen, therefore unconstitutionally restricting a 
defendant’s choice of counsel. 
Aside from the constitutional implications, the Federal 
Criminal Forfeiture Statute inherently poses several ethical 
issues.  First, criminal asset forfeiture may lead to criminal 
contingency fees, in application.  A contingency fee is payment 
for services conditioned on a particular outcome, such as 
favorable judgment or successful settlement out of court.83  In 
the case of a criminal defendant, a contingency fee would 
typically require the defendant to pay his or her attorney only if 
found not guilty.  Although not illegal, criminal contingency fees 
have been deemed unethical.84  The American Bar Association 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibits a 
 
81.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
82.  See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 600 (1989); Caplin 
& Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 617 (1989). 
83.  Contingent fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
84.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(d)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1979). 
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lawyer from arranging, charging, or collecting “a contingent fee 
for representing a defendant in a criminal case.”85  Now consider 
a situation where all of a criminal defendant’s assets are deemed 
sufficiently connected to illegal activity and are forfeited to the 
Government pretrial.  In this situation, said defendant would 
not have the funds to retain a lawyer that he or she could have 
afforded had he or she been able to use those assets. 
Here, there are only two options for a defendant to be 
represented by counsel of their choice.  First, the defendant could 
be represented by a Government-provided lawyer, or another 
lawyer on a pro bono basis.  The other option would be for the 
defendant to retain a lawyer and postpone payment until the 
defendant regains access to his assets.  When would that occur?  
Either after a verdict of not guilty or some other type of 
agreement to plea down to a lesser charge.  This type of situation 
would not only present ethical issues for the lawyers involved, 
but there is also the possibility that such payment would lead to 
a lawyer encouraging their client to take a plea deal in order to 
be paid. 
Further, what about the situation where certain assets are 
released in consideration for agreeing to plead guilty?  It is not 
inconceivable to imagine a situation where a defendant facing a 
lengthy RICO or CCE sentence would want to ensure his or her 
family is provided for while they are gone, and in order to do so, 
they might agree to plead guilty.  The Government’s previously 
unbridled authority to seize all assets might pressure a 
defendant to plead guilty in order to secure the release of some 
assets.  This exact situation was seen in Caplin & Drysdale, 
where Reckmeyer and the Government entered into a plea deal 
whereby Reckmeyer would plead guilty in return for, inter alia, 
forfeiture of only specified assets.86  This, surely, poses a 
legitimate ethical issue to consider when examining the scope of 
the Government’s power under the Federal Criminal Forfeiture 
Statute. 
Yet another potential ethical issue is this: if a RICO or CCE 
defendant uses assets that are unfrozen, in consideration of a 
plea deal or some other arrangement whereby the assets are 
 
85.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(d)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
86.  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 617 
(1989). 
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released, to pay a lawyer, then who is technically paying the 
attorney for his or her services?  Under this scenario, one could 
argue that the Government is technically paying the attorney, 
as the assets were legally seized by the Government, and were 
only paid out to the attorney because the Government 
authorized the release. 
Another thing to consider is the underlying legal theory that 
supports the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute.  Is the 
purpose punitive or maybe rehabilitative or to serve as a 
deterrent?  Of course, on its face, asset forfeiture does not have 
“any special rehabilitative or deterrent value[.]”87  Moreover, 
“[i]n itself, forfeiture only requires the criminal to disgorge his 
ill-gotten gains if caught and convicted, thus restoring the status 
quo ante.  Yet no child will be deterred from stealing cookies if 
the penalty is limited to putting the cookies back in the jar.”88  
Further, what about the “cookies,” or proceeds, already 
expended?  A defendant cannot be forced to regurgitate that 
which he has already consumed.  “At worst the child will be no 
worse off than before the theft.”89 
Then, is restitution the fundamental, underlying purpose?  
But what if there are no true victims to pay back, as with a drug 
dealing case tried under CCE?  Then any non-punitive 
restitutive justification seems more like retribution by the 
Government – a unique type of vengeance-like punishment.  
Further, any argument that a dominant purpose of the Federal 
Criminal Forfeiture Statute is “‘to divest the [criminal] 
association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains,’”90 must fail.  As 
has been readily used, the Government has the ability to seek 
forfeiture of other property as a substitute asset if tracing the 
“tainted” asset proves impossible.91 
 
 
87.  Fried, supra note 41, at 358. 
88.  Id. at 371-72. 
89.  Id. at 372. “In reality, the immediate restoration of goods converted 
and consumed over time, for example, the forfeiture of substitute assets, may 
be experienced as a loss more severe than the original gain. This may have an 
incidental deterrent effect.” Id. at 372 n.193. 
90.  Fried, supra note 41, at 343 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 
U.S. 576, 585 (1981)). 
91.  Garretson, supra note 20, at 52 (citing United States v. Candelaria-
Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 42 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
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V. Reining in the Government: A Luis Case Analysis 
 
This Part analyzes how a recent United States Supreme 
Court decision, Luis v. United States, has changed the way that 
21 U.S.C. § 853 is applied through RICO and CCE, by 
reinforcing the nexus requirement, which had previously been 
applied lackadaisically. 
Since 1989, as discussed earlier, application of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853, the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute, seems to have 
been expanding, giving more and more power to the Government 
each time an issue pertaining to a RICO or CCE case reached 
the United States Supreme Court. However, in March 2016, the 
United States Supreme Court essentially halted this trend.  In 
Luis v. United States, defendant Luis was charged and indicted 
with, among other things, paying kickbacks and conspiring to 
commit fraud, totaling $45 million, most of which she had spent 
by the time of her indictment.92  Following the indictment, the 
District Court issued a temporary restraining order preventing 
Luis from dissipating her remaining assets – $2 million – which 
were unrelated to the crimes.93  Luis challenged the ability of the 
Government to legally seize assets that are not sufficiently 
connected to illegal activity. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that 
pretrial forfeiture of assets, which are unrelated to the crimes 
listed on the indictment, that are necessary to retain counsel of 
choice, violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.94  
Further, the United States Supreme Court held that although 
the assets might, as the indictment proved, be ultimately 
subjected to forfeiture absent a connection to criminal activity – 
such as, upon a conviction, forfeited or seized to pay the 
statutory fines – this does not overcome the fact that the $2 
million in this case is untraceable to Luis’ illegal acts.  Therefore, 
the Government’s interest in preservation is outweighed by the 
defendant’s constitutional right. 
The requirement that the seized assets be sufficiently 
connected to the illegal activity has existed, on the face of the 
 
92.  136 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (2016). 
93.  Id. at 1088. 
94.  Id. at 1089. 
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statute, since its enactment in 1970.95  It appears that up until 
the Luis holding, the Government was seizing certain assets 
without meeting their burden of establishing a nexus between 
the property and the crime.  At first glance, this might seem like 
a simple error in judgment because of a failure by the 
Government to meet their burden and oversight as to this fact 
by the lower courts.  This case, however, sets the precedent that 
although the Government may be given deference with regard to 
discretion in identifying seizeable assets, there must be a limit.  
As viewed from a macro level, this case establishes that, 
although previously 21 U.S.C. § 853 has been interpreted 
liberally so as to give the Government great authority and 
discretion; however, liberal interpretation will not, and cannot, 
override the plain language requirement of a sufficient nexus 
between the property and the underlying crime. 
With a RICO or CCE indictment, and subsequent jury trial, 
a jury is to determine, post-conviction, if the Government met its 
burden of establishing the nexus requirement.96  This results in 
the jury first returning a general verdict, as to the defendant’s 
guilt of the underlying crime, and then returning a special 
verdict, so that “the jury hears evidence of the defendant’s guilt 
for the underlying crime separately from hearing evidence about 
forfeiture[.]”97  This bifurcated process is considered “fairer to 
the defendant, and it prevents the jury from considering the 
possibility of a large forfeiture in considering a defendant’s 
guilt.”98  As seen in the Luis case, however, it is possible that the 
bifurcation of the verdicts actually lowers the burden on the 
Government to establish a nexus, thus making the application 
of 21 U.S.C. § 853 unfair. 
It is plausible to imagine a situation where a jury, after 
convicting a defendant of significant criminal charges within the 
purview, or culminating to the level of RICO and CCE might 
seek to further punish, which is, in fact, one fundamental 
 
95.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (mandating that, in order to seize 
property, “the government [must] establish[] the requisite nexus between the 
property and the offense.”). 
96.  Garretson, supra note 20, at 51 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(4)). 
97.  Id. at 52 (citing United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 558-59 (10th 
Cir. 1990); HOWARD E. WILLIAMS, ASSET FORFEITURE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT 
PERSPECTIVE 11 (2002)). 
98.  Id. at 52. 
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purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 853, by having his assets forfeited to the 
Government.  It is further plausible to imagine that the same 
jury might overlook the statutorily imposed nexus requirement 
or not see it as the significant hurdle that it is, and return a 
verdict that the Government has met its burden when it simply 
has not, based on the facts.  Without there being much more the 
judicial system can do to eliminate personal biases on the jury, 
the Luis holding is a rightful check on the Government’s broad 
authority. 
The hypothetical situation presented above poses a problem 
– the solution of which is simply the lesser of two evils: Do you 
leave the charges of the underlying crime and the Government’s 
additional burden of establishing a nexus for forfeiture in one 
trial, where the jury is able to consider the potential magnitude 
of the allegedly illegal assets involved while determining overall 
guilt of the predicate crime, or do you bifurcate the processes and 
have the jury consider the connection between the assets and the 
crime after having determined that the person is guilty of such 
substantial criminal activity?  The former has been formally 
deemed the better option through both case law and 
codification.99  This, however, does not seem like a true ‘solution’ 
given that the statute has underlying ethical and constitutional 
concerns. 
 
VI. The Future of The Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute 
 
Recently, another case involving the interpretation of the 
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute was before the United 
States Supreme Court.  In Nacchio v. United States, defendant 
Nacchio was indicted on forty-two counts of insider trading.100  
Nacchio was ultimately found guilty on nineteen counts and was 
subsequently sentenced to seventy-two months in prison, was 
fined $19 million, and was ordered to forfeit $52,007,545.47 – 
the “tainted” income he derived from the insider trading.101  
Evidentiary issues eventually led to Nacchio’s sentence being 
 
99.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2; United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 558-
59 (10th Cir. 1990). 
100.  824 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2239 
(2017). 
101.  Id. at 1373. 
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reduced to seventy months in prison and the forfeiture was 
reduced to $44,632,464.38.102  The $19 million fine remained 
intact.103 
The main question is whether or not a forfeiture is tax 
deductible.  The argument for a deduction is based on the theory 
that asset forfeiture, in this case, was used for restitution, rather 
than punitive purposes.  This theory is not without merit.  The 
Internal Revenue Code provides for special relief to a taxpayer 
who is required to restore funds to a third party where the 
taxpayer included the funds in his income in a prior taxable year 
when it then “appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted 
right” to the funds.104  In previous white collar crimes, some 
circuits have held that restitution is “a remedial measure to 
compensate another party, not a fine or similar penalty,” and is 
thus deductible.105 
The Federal Circuit ultimately held that Nacchio is 
estopped by his criminal conviction for seeking tax relief under 
§ 1341.106  Despite the fact that the prosecutor at trial advised 
the court that “the Government’s intention is for . . . the 
forfeiture funds[] to be used to compensate victims,”107 because 
the cumulative loss of the victims was less than the total 
forfeiture, the “economic reality is that Nacchio was punished 
through forfeiture” and the deduction of such a fine is 
disallowed.108 
Nacchio subsequently petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari.  The petition posed two 
questions: 
 
(1) Whether funds forfeited pursuant to a criminal 
conviction are deductible in cases in which such 
forfeited funds (in contrast with a simultaneously 
 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. at 1374; I.R.C. § 1341 (2012). 
105. Nacchio, 824 F.3d. at 1379-80 (quoting Stephens v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 905 F.2d 667, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
106.  Id. at 1382. 
107.  Id. at 1374. 
108.  Id. at 1381. 
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imposed punitive fine) are earmarked and used to 
compensate victims of the underlying criminal 
offense; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit’s holding in this case that 
such forfeited funds are not deductible conflicts 
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd 
Circuit’s holding in Stephens v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue and the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the 1st Circuit’s holding in Fresenius Medical 
Care Holdings, Inc. v. United States.109 
 
As the prosecution stated in Nacchio, the Government’s 
purpose was to restore the victims.  That would signal a 
restitutive purpose, which would require reversal.  To the 
contrary, the Federal Circuit held that the Federal Criminal 
Forfeiture Statute acts more as a fine or penalty, thus 
identifying the primary underlying purpose as punitive.  The 
Nacchio petition was denied on June 12, 2017,110 meaning that 
the question as to what the true purpose of the Federal Criminal 
Forfeiture Statute is remains unanswered. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Crime cinema’s portrayal of raids on a crime organization’s 
facilities have proven to be as dramatic and controversial as the 
real-life application of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute.  
The seizure of illegal assets you see on the screen is typically 
accompanied by another seizure at a later date, this time of 
illegally-obtained assets.  Pursuant to the Federal Criminal 
Forfeiture Statute, the Government may seize any assets of a 
criminal defendant that are sufficiently related to the predicate 
crime for which they are facing judgment.  Further, these 
seizures are not postponed until final judgment – the 
Government may seek a preliminary injunction freezing certain 
 
109.  Kate Howard, Petitions of the Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 2017, 
11:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/02/petition-of-the-day-1097/. 
110.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nacchio v. United States, 824 F.3d 
1370 (Fed. Circuit 2016) (No. 16-810) (filed on December 21, 2016).  However 
petition for Writ of Certiorari was subsequently denied on June 12, 2017. See 
generally Nacchio v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 2239 (2017). 
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assets after a finding of probable cause.  This, of course, raises 
significant constitutional and ethical issues.  Despite its initial 
slow and fruitless application, forfeitures pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853 became synonymous with major criminal charges such as 
RICO and CCE.  As the Government began increasing its use of 
the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute, so too did the courts 
increase the Government’s power in that application.  United 
States Supreme Court cases such as Caplin & Drysdale v. 
United States and United States v. Monsanto stood for the 
powerful precedent that the Federal Criminal Forfeiture 
Statute, which does not include a carved-out exception for 
attorney’s fees, does not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  This includes the Government’s right to a 
pretrial asset seizure, which necessarily has implications on a 
defendant’s choice of counsel.  These holdings strengthened, if 
not broadened, the Government’s power in applying the Federal 
Criminal Forfeiture Statute.  Following the Caplin & Drysdale 
and Monsanto holdings, a circuit split evolved regarding the 
power of the Government; the question: should evidentiary 
rulings that lead to the Government’s authority to seize a 
defendant’s assets at trial be reviewable?  The United States 
Supreme Court ultimately answered that question in the 
negative in Kaley v. United States.  Yet again, another ruling 
strengthening the Government’s power in asset forfeiture cases. 
Even with the constitutionality question settled, there 
remains ethical considerations that silently exist alongside 
every application of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute.  It 
is critical that these issues are considered when contemplating 
how much power the Government should be given to seize a 
defendant’s assets.  Contingency fees, conflicts of interest 
relating to payment, pressuring plea deals, and the 
contemplation of what the true purpose is underlying the 
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute are among the many.  
Given the serious ethical questions, it is no surprise that in 2016 
the United States Supreme Court, in Luis v. United States, 
appeared to reign in the Government’s power, by reiterating the 
need for and importance of the Government’s burden of 
establishing a sufficient nexus between the assets and the 
underlying crimes.  The future of the Government’s authority in 
applying the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute is left to be 
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seen.  With the Nacchio v. United States petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari denied, the question of whether the Criminal Federal 
Forfeiture Statute primarily serves a restitutive or punitive 
purpose remains undetermined.  Clarification as to the Criminal 
Federal Forfeiture Statute’s underlying purpose would have an 
effect on the Government’s vast power in its ability to seize 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853, and the question continues to be 
ripe for consideration. 
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